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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
\•JILLINI EARL HARRISON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16425 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by complaint and information 
with arranging for the distribution for value of a controlled 
substance, marijuana, in violation of Utah Code Ann., 
§ 58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv), (1953) as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried without a jury before the 
Honorable Allan B. Sorenson on March 21, 1979, and was 
found guilty as charged. Following a pre-sentence report, 
he was sentenced to a term not to exceed five years in the 
Ctah State Prison. 
.... 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent urges the Court to affirm the convicti~ 
and sentence of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At 7:30 p.m. on November 26, 1978, a police 
informant named Jim Schnorrenberg (hereinafter "Jim"), met 
with officers at the Vernal City Police station (T. 12, 37). 
The police skin-searched Jim. They also examined his car 
by looking under the dash and front seat and under everythin~ 
which was.notsecured down (T. 13, 27, 32, 37). The police 
then gave Jim $25.00. They noted the serial numbers of the 
money and had him sign an agreement which indicated that he 
would only use the money for the purchase of controlled 
substances in connection with police activities (T. 13). 
The police then followed Jim as he drove his own 
car to the house of a~pellant (T. 14, 28, 38). He entered 
appellant's home and asked appellant and appellant's girl-
friend if he could buy cocaine or "bags" (T. 39, 66, 81). 
Appellant indicated that he didn't have any, but that he kn~ 
a girl named "Suzy" who might be able to provide some 
marijuana (T. 39, 67, 81). Jim went back to the police 
station and was researched (T. 15). 
-2-
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At 8:45 p.m. the same evening, Jim returned 
to appellant's house, again followed and observed by police 
officers (T. 15, 29, 39). Appellant and Jim entered the 
latter's car and drove to an apartment where Suzy was 
supposed to be staying (T. 15, 29, 40, 68, 82). Although 
it is unclear, appellant's girlfriend may also have accompanied 
them (T. 68, 82, 83). The group then obtained gasoline and 
proceeded to a J.B. 's restaurant where they had been told 
Suzy would be found (T. 16, 40, 69, 83). 
Jim and appellant entered the restaurant where 
they found Suzy with her friend Nick. Appellant introduced 
Jim to Suzy and took a seat in her booth across the table. 
Jim sat in the booth behind (T. 41, 84-85). Appellant told 
Suzy that Jim wished to buy some marijuana and asked Nick 
if he would move so Jim could sit next to Suzy to see the 
product (T. 41, 42). Jim moved and was shown marijuana. 
He purchased three bags for $25.00 (T. 42). 
Jim and appellant returned to appellant's house 
where some marijuana was shared with or given to appellant 
and the three bags of marijuana were combined into one 
larger bag (T. 43, 72 and 87). Jim testified that 
appellant asked if he would give him a "joint" or two for 
setting up the buy (T. 43). Appellant and his girlfriend 
both indicated that Ji~ and aopellant shared a "joint" at 
Jim's suagestion (T. 72, 87). 
-3-
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Jim returned to the Vernal Police Department 
where he gave them a bag of marijuana. His car and 
person were again searched (T. 17, 44). The bag of 
marijuana taken from Jim was introduced at trial and 
was stipulated to be marijuana (T. 60), although appellant 
objected to its introduction on the basis that the searches 
of the car were not thorough enough to guarantee that the 
marijuana was the same substance purchased from Suzy (T. 61). 
The court found appellant guilty of the crime 
charged and sentenced him to a term of not more than five 




UTAH CODE ANN., § 58-37-8 (1) (a) 
(iv), (1953), AS AMENDED IS NOT 
VAGUE OR UNCLEAR. 
Utah Code Ann., § 58-37-8 (1953), as amended, 
(1) (a) Except as authorized by 
this act, it shall be unlawful for any 
person knowingly and intentionally: 
(iv) To agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute or dispense a controlled 
substance for value or to negotiate to 
have a controlled substance distributed 
or dispensed for value 
The crime charged in the instant matter succinctly requires 
that the actor must knowingly or intentionally arrange to 
have a controlled substance distributed for value. The 
issue presented by this appeal is whether setting up a 
-4-
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"buy'', that is, introducing a potential customer to a dealer 
of illicit substances, constitutes knowingly or intentionally 
arranging for the distribution for value of the illicit 
substance. If such is clearly the case, then appellant 
has no standing to challenge the statute as vague even 
if the statute might be unclear in its application to 
other conduct. This Court noted in State v. Phillips, 540 
P.2d 936 (Utah, 1975): 
Also important to be considered . 
is the principle that no one should be 
entitled to challenge a statute and have 
it declared void because it may unjustly 
affect someone else, but could properly 
do so only if his own rights are adversely 
affected. 
Id. at 940. See also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733. 756 (1974). 
In Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah, 1974), 
this Court enunciated several more general rules applicable 
to a determination of the constitutionality of statutes: 
Because the duty rests upon the courts 
to determine the scope of the government, 
they have a special resporisibility to 
exercise a high degree of caution and 
restraint to keep themselves within 
the limitations of the judicial power 
in order not to infringe upon the 
prerogatives of the executive or the 
legislative branches. In harmony with 
that policy it is the well-established 
rule that legislative enactments are 
endowed with a strong presumption of 
validity; and that they would not be 
declared unconstitutional if there is 
any reasonable basis upon which they can 
-5-
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be found to come within the 
constitutional framework; and that 
a statute will not be stricken down as 
being unconstitutional unless it appears 
to be so beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 806-807. See also Utah Code Ann., § 68-3-2 (1953, 
as amended). 
This Court has also stated: 
Concerning the question of 
uncertainty or vagueness of 
statutes, the authorities seem to be 
in accord that the test a statute must 
meet to be valid is: It must be suf-
ficiently definite (a) to inform persons 
of ordinary intelligence, who would be 
law abiding, what their conduct must be 
to conform to its requirements; (b) to 
advise a defendant accused of violating 
it just what constitutes the offense with 
which he is charged, and {c) to be 
susceptible of uniform interpretation and 
application by those charged with re-
sponsibility of applying and enforcing it. 
State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561, 564 (1952) See 
also Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037 (Utah, 197: 
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (l92G 
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 574, 572-573 (1974), and Jellum v. 
Cupp, 475 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir., 1973). 
In the instant matter, most of the terms in the 
statute under which 3ppellant was charged are specifically 
defined. Stated again, appellant was charged with having 
knowingly or intentionally arranging for the distribution 
for value of a controlled substance (see Utah Code Ann., 
-6-
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Section 58-37-8 (a) (a) (iv), supra). "Knowingly and 
intentionally" are defined in Utah Code Ann., § 76-2-103 
(1953), as amended, as: 
. when it is his (the actor's) 
conscious objective or desire to engage 
in the conduct or cause the result 
(intentionally) or, 
. when he is aware this his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause 
the result, (knowingly . 
"Distribution for value" is defined in Utah Code Ann., 
Section 53-37-2(8), (1953), as amended, as: 
to deliver a controlled 
substance in exchange for com-
pensation, consideration, or item 
of value, or promise therefor . 
Finally, "controlled substance" is defined in Utah Code 
Ann., § 58-37-2 (5) (1953), as amended: 
The words "controlled substance" 
mean a drug, substance, or immediate 
precursor in schedules I, II, III, IV, 
or v of section 58-37-4. The words do 
not include distilled spirits, wine, or 
malt beverages, as those terms are 
defined or used in Title 32, tobacco or 
food. 
The only term within the crime charged in the 
instant matter which is not specifically defined within the 
Utah Code is the word "arrange." Although appellant would 
argue otherwise, (Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-4), the word 
"arrange" is commonly used and well understood. An arrangement 
is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Ed. 
unabr~, 1934, as: 
-7-
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(3) An agreement or settlement 
of details made in anticipation; as, 
arrangements for receiving company. 
Stated differently, to arrangeisto prepare or provide for 
the occurance of some expected event. As applied to this 
statute, an actor must knowingly and intentionally arrange 
for a sale to take place. In other words, the actor must 
perform an act or series of acts in anticipation of or in 
preparation for a sale of controlled substances which he 
either wants to take place or is reasonably certain will 
take place. 
The Packard test is clearly satisfied by this 
statute. (State v. Packard, supra). A person wishing to 
abide by the law is put on notice that he must have 
nothing to do with a sale of illicit substances, whether for 
profit or not. A person charged with the crime knows that ~ 
is charged with helping to set up an illegal sale of con-
trolled substances. Finally, the statute is "susceptible 
of uniform interpretation and application by t;10se charged 
with responsibility of applying and enforcing it." (State 1· 
Packard, supra). Just as selling a crowbar in a hardware 
store might aid a burglar in his work but not constitute 
the crime of aiding and abetting in b~~glary, so an action 
which made possible an illegal drug purchase but which was 
-8-
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not done knowingly or intentionally for that purpose does 
not fit within the proscription of the statute. Nevertheless, 
those who purposefully act to assist in or "arrange" for the 
sale of drugs are clearly doing so in violation of the law. 
courts and law enforcement officials are not left to guess 
at the meaning of the statute, its meaning is clear. It 
follows that the statute is not void for vagueness and should 
be upheld. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION 
OF THE TRIER OF FACT THAT APPELLANT 
KNE\~ OR INTENDED THAT THERE \~OULD BE 
A DISTRIBUTION FOR VALUE OF A CON-
TROLLED SUBSTANCE AS A RESULT OF HIS 
ACTIONS. 
Appellant argues that the state failed to establish 
the proof necessary for a conviction under the crime charged 
in that it failed to either, (1) show that appellant received 
value or consideration for his part in the transaction, or, 
(2) show that appellant knew or intended that a distribution 
for value would take place between the police informant and 
Suzy (Appellant's Brief, Point II at pp. 6-8). 
Initially, it must be noted that there was evidence 
to the effect that appellant asked for and received some of 
the marijuana purchased for his part in setting up the 
deal (T. ~3). Although this testimony was contradicted 
-9-
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by both appellant and his girlfriend (T. 72, 87), the 
credibility of the various witnesses and determination of 
controverted issues is the province of the trier of fact. 
See State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah, 1977); State v. 
Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah, 1976); and State v. \~ilson, 565 
P.2d 66 (Utah, 1977). 
Nevertheless, even if it is assumed that appellant 
received no compensation for his part, the elements of the 
crime charged do not require proof that the defendant 
received value, only that a distribution for value took 
place and that the defendant intended or was reasonably 
certain that a distribution for value would take place as 
a result of his actions (see Utah Code Ann., § 58-37-8, supra 
~~ether or not the State of Utah is or should be concerned 
with one who sets up a sale of drugs but receives no com-
pensation is a judgment already made by the legislature. 
It would be improper for this Court to re-examine such a 
policy decision. See Greaves v. State, supra. 
Finally, appellant's claim that he did not kno~ 
or intend that a distribution for value would take place 
as a result of his actions is not supported by the :idence. 
Appellant told the seller, Suzy, that the informanL wanted 
to "buy" some of the product (T. 41). The informant 
testified that the appellant told him that he had no cocaino 
-10-
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but that "he had a girl in from Salt Lake, a girlfriend, 
Suzy; that she might could fix me up if she hadn't sold 
out." (T. 52). He also asked Nick to move so the 
informant could bargain with Suzy (T. 42). All of this, 
plus the generally known fact that marijuana is not given 
away but is usually sold, make the inference that 
appellant knew or intended that a sale of marijuana for 
value would result from his actions that night reasonable 
and proper. 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE ADMISSION 
OF THE ~RIJUANA ALLEGEDLY PURCHASED 
AS A RESULT OF APPELLANT'S ARRANGEMEN~S. 
Admissibility of a physical object of evidence is 
a discretionary matter for the trial court. The ruling of 
the trial court in such a matter should not be overturned 
unless there is an abuse of discretion shown. See State v. 
t1adsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P.2d 670, 672 (1972). There 
'Nas no abuse of discretion shown in the instant matter. The 
bag of marijuana co~plained of was identified by the police 
informant as the bag he put the marijuana into on the night 
in question (T. 43-44). Appellant's counsel objected to the 
admission of the bag, claiming that there was a lack of 
evidence supporting an inference that the bag was the same 
bag into which the informant had put the marijuana purchased 
-11-
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from Suzy. Although he denied that his objection went to 
the weight to be given the evidence rather than to its 
admissibility, he was unable to cite, then or now, any rule 
of law to justify his position (T. 61, Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 8-9). 
The marijuana was certainly relevant evidence within 
the scope of Rule 1 of the Rules of Evidence: 
(1) "Evidence," as used in these 
rules, includes the means, oral, 
documentary, or physical, used as proof 
on issues of fact. 
( 2) "Relevant evidence" means 
evidence having any tendency in reason 
to prove or disprove the existence of any 
material fact. 
Whether or not the evidence was what it was claimed to be is 
a matter for the trier of fact to determine, and does not 
pertain to the admissibility in this instance. 
Furthermore, even if it is assumed that the 
evidence was improperly admitted, Rule 4 of the Rules of 
Evidence provides that the erroneous admission of evidence 
is not grounds for reversal unless the evidence can be said 
to have had a substantial influence upon the verdict. In 
this matter, there was substantial evidence beyond the 
marijuana itself which indicated that a sale of marijuana 
took place. Appellant's girlfriend testified that the 
bag looked like the one the informant put the marijuana into 
(T. 71). Although appellant denies having been aware at 
-12-
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the time that a sale of marijuana was taking place, the 
evidence that a sale did take place was uncontradicted. 
Moreover, the evidence clearly indicated that appellant 
intended that a sale would take place (see Point II, supra). 
Even if the marijuana itself had not been introduced, there 
was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find 
that appellant intentionally arranged for the sale of a 
controlled substance. Consequently, there was no 
prejudicial error in the trial court's admission of the 
bag of marijuana as evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The crime of arranging for the distribution of 
a controlled substance for value is clear and well defined. 
Those seeking to conform their actions to the law are 
clearly advised of what conduct is prohibited. Those 
charged are ~pprised of what is claimed as guilty conduct. 
Finally, those entrusted with enforcing the law are given 
clear standards to guide their actions. The law is not overly 
vague and should be upheld as a constitutional act of the 
legislature. 
Although the evidence was contradicted by 
appellant, there was testimony to the effect that appellant 
sought and received some of the marijuana purchased in 
-13-
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return for setting up the sale. Moreover, it is clear 
that appellant knew or intended that a sale of marijuana 
would take place as a result of his action in introducing 
the police informant to Suzy. 
Finally, there was no error in the admission of 
the marijuana as evidence. Appellant's objections go to 
the weight to be accorded the evidence, not its admissibili~.~ 
The marijuana was relevant evidence within the scope of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Respondent urges this Court to affirm the convicti~ 
and sentence of the lower cour~ in this mat~er. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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